

The Great Strife in Russian history of the XVII century

1. THE PERIOD BETWEEN THE DEATH OF “IVAN THE TERRIBLE”, ALSO KNOWN AS SIMEON, AND THE GREAT STRIFE

According to the Romanovian version, “Ivan the Terrible” died in 1584. Our hypothesis suggests that the deceased can really be identified as the old Khan Simeon, christened Ivan at inauguration. The boyar Godunov gains prominence towards the end of his reign. This personality is usually identified as Boris Godunov, the next Czar. One of his old portraits can be seen in fig. 9.1. It is however odd that Boris had not occupied any prominent positions around that time, unlike other Godunovs – Dmitriy, Stepan etc ([775]). We shall return to the “Godunov issue” below.

In 1584 Fyodor Ivanovich ascends to the throne. He is presumed to have been a son of “Ivan the Terrible”. According to our reconstruction, he had indeed been the son of the previous Czar – Simeon, aka Ivan, or the last of the four Czars later compressed into a single figure of “Ivan the Terrible”. It is known that the relations of Fyodor’s wife Irina Godunova all attain influential positions during his reign. Historians presume Fyodor to have died heirless. However, we believe this to be untrue – his son was Boris Fyodorovich, the heir to the throne and the next Czar. Later on he was renamed “Godunov” (the latter being his mother’s maiden name) by the Romanovian his-

torians. We shall cite our argumentation in support of this point of view below.

Further on, Czar Ivan Ivanovich, the son of Ivan IV, who was removed from power in 1572, as a result of a civil war, died in 1581 at the age of 30 years or so. This event became reflected in the Romanovian and Millerian history as the death of Ivan Ivanovich, the son of “Ivan the Terrible” in 1581. As the further analysis of event demonstrates, he had a son named Dmitriy, qv in fig. 9.2. We are thus of the opinion that two dynastic branches came into existence as a result, the first one being the offspring of Ivan IV and Ivan Ivanovich raised by the Romanovs, and the second – the descendants of Khan Simeon (Ivan). The latter represent the old Horde dynasty (Czar Simeon, or Ivan, his son, Czar Fyodor Ivanovich, and then the son of Fyodor – Czar Boris Fyodorovich, known to us as Boris “Godunov” nowadays).

2. CZAR BORIS FYODOROVICH “GODUNOV”

2.1. Czar Boris Fyodorovich is most likely to have been the son of Czar Fyodor Ivanovich

In 1591, in the reign of Czar Fyodor Ivanovich, Gazi-Girey (Russian name translating as “The Heroic Cossack”?) sent a letter to Boris Fyodorovich (“Godunov”). It has survived until the present day, and can



Fig. 9.1. Czar, or Khan, Boris “Godunov”. Miniature taken from the “Titular Book” of 1672. Taken from [550], page 101.

be seen in [759], where it is referred to as “the epistle of the Crimean Khan to the Muscovite boyar Boris Godunov”. However, there are marks from the royal chancellery on the letter, wherein they were registered. These marks tell us something entirely different. Let us quote:

“There are the following marks on the reverse:

1) ‘Translated in 7099’,

2) ‘The epistle to Czar Boris Fyodorovich sent on behalf of the Crimean Czar ... by Akhmat-Ata, a close friend of his’” ([759], Volume 1, page 46).

The letter is in Arabic, which is why the Muscovite official wrote the subject of the letter on the reverse in Russian – an obvious thing to do.

The amazing thing is that Godunov is called Czar here – as early as in 1591, seven years prior to the death of Czar Fyodor. The reference is made in an original official document, no less! This can only mean that Boris had been the son and heir of Czar Fyodor Ivanovich, which is the only possibility for him to be called Czar. The Muscovite Czars had in-

herited the Byzantine custom of calling their heirs apparent Czars in childhood or adolescence. Boris Fyodorovich “Godunov” had done the same; his son Fyodor was referred to as Czar and Great Prince in official papers.

2.2. Our hypothesis about Boris “Godunov” being the son of Czar Fyodor is confirmed by the old documents

We have therefore received a direct indication that Boris Godunov had been the son of Czar Fyodor Ivanovich. This is far from being the only such indication – for instance, we learn about “Varkoch, the Austrian envoy, arriving in Moscow. The ruler invited him to his palace; the ceremony looked like a royal audience. There were guards in the court that stood from gate to gate, and Boris’s boyars were wearing ‘gilded attire and golden chains’ as they waited for the ambassador in the hall. The Austrian kissed Godunov’s hand and gave him the private missive of the emperor” ([777], page 38). Our reconstruction makes it perfectly obvious that the passage in question describes the reception of the envoy by Boris, Czar of Moscow. His father had still been alive, but the son and heir was already beginning to do royal duties apart from being referred to as Czar (such as receiving envoys). This was common practice at the Russian court (it suffices to remember Ivan III, who had reigned in the last years of his father, Vassily II. Fyodor, the son and heir of Boris, had also been known as Czar when Boris was still alive.

The Romanovian point of view leads us to a great number of contradictions and questions. Could the Czar’s “brother-in-law” have indeed acted in his lieu quite as openly? Where does this office of a “governor” under a living Czar come from, anyway, one that causes historians a great deal of embarrassment whenever they’re forced to mention it in their attempts to make the old document data concur with their distorted perception of the Russian history? We shall proceed to learn the origins of this strange title of a “governor”, unheard of elsewhere in Russian history. Let us turn to *Boris Godunov*, another oeuvre of Skrynnikov’s ([777]). Apparently, “Godunov assumed a great number of loud titles” ([777], page 85). He had used them domestically as well as during his

contacts with foreign officials. According to Skrynnikov, “the foreigners who had resided in Moscow were only happy to oblige him” ([777], page 85). For instance, the Englishman Gorsej had “made the Queen familiar with the decrees of Boris that were addressed to Gorsej personally” ([777], page 85). How was the title of Boris written in these decrees, one wonders? Skrynnikov renders the title as “The Governor of the Famed Land Russia Appointed by the Lord” ([777], page 86). This is obviously a corruption of the standard Russian formula “Czar of All Russia by the Will of the Lord”. There were no mysterious “governors” in Russia – there were Czars.

The English Queen addressed Boris as “Dear Cousin” in her letters ([777], page 86). Sovereign rulers were accustomed to addressing each other as “brother”, “cousin”, “son” etc.

2.3. The reasons why the Romanovs had distorted the history of Boris Godunov

We are of the opinion that the Romanovs had distorted the pre-Romanovian history to a great extent upon coming to power. This had naturally also concerned the history of Czar Boris, who was declared foreign to the royal bloodline, a stranger who had usurped the throne employing his cunning and intrigue tactics. Russian documents mentioning Boris were edited so as to introduce a strange “Governor Boris Godunov” in lieu of the royal son and heir Boris Fyodorovich. However, the Romanovs were obviously incapable of rewriting the foreign documents that contained references to Czar Boris, likewise his epistles to foreign rulers kept in their archives. Hence the strange discrepancy between the titles used by the foreigners when addressing Boris and the titles found in the Russian documents edited by the Romanovs. According to Skrynnikov, “no matter how the foreigners may have addressed Boris, the officials of the Foreign Office [in Moscow – Auth.] had adhered to his actual title rigidly” ([777], page 86).

The situation is truly amazing. Historians are of the opinion that the foreign rulers had used erroneous titles when they addressed Boris – ones that were much higher than the more “modest” ones allegedly used at home. However, titles were treated extremely seriously in that epoch – their use in corre-




Fig. 9.2. Our reconstruction of the genealogical tree of the Czars, or Khans, regnant in the epoch of “Ivan the Terrible”.

spondence was observed meticulously, and a slight alteration of a title used in an official missive could lead to an international conflict.

Why had the Romanovs hated Czar Boris “Godunov” that much? The answer is simple. Under Godunov, “the boyar clan of the Romanovs was persecuted the most ... The brothers Romanov were accused of the gravest crime against the state – plotting to murder the Czar. This crime was only punishable by death. Boris had tergiversated for a long while, not knowing what to do ... Their fate was finally decided. Fyodor Romanov had been forced to take the oaths and was subsequently sent to a faraway northern monastery. His younger brothers were exiled; Alexander, Mikhail and Vassily Romanov died in exile, and rumours hastened to claim a connexion between their demise and certain secret orders given by the Czar ... After the Romanovs became enthroned, the chroniclers took good care of making Godunov look like a true villain, simultaneously presenting the members of the clan that fell from grace [the Romanovs – Auth.] as martyrs” ([777], pages 134-136).

2.4. The legal heir of Czar Fyodor Ivanovich

We are told that Czar Fyodor Ivanovich “had died intestate” ([777], page 106). This strikes us as very odd indeed. Skrynnikov tries to explain this amazing circumstance by Czar Fyodor’s “poor mental capacity”. One may indeed explain anything in this manner.

However, Skrynnikov immediately reports the following: “there was the official version of the Czar’s testament, wherein he had left the throne to his wife Irina, and the kingdom with his own soul – to Boris” ([777], page 106). Thus, according to the official Russian documents of the epoch, the kingdom had been left to Boris, who was explicitly called heir. This is perfectly natural, if we are to assume that Fyodor had been the father of Boris. Below we shall once again demonstrate that Boris had still been very young when Fyodor died, which must be why the latter had left the throne to Irina, his wife, and the mother of his son – not a “sister” of Boris, as modern historians are trying to convince us.

Moreover, according to the sources, after the death of Fyodor his subjects “had to swear fealty to Patriarch Iov and the Orthodox faith, Czarina Irina, Governor Boris and his children” ([777], page 107). Skrynnikov is of the opinion that this fealty had been preposterous enough to confuse everyone. Indeed, it does seem quite absurd from the traditional point of view – a fealty is sworn to the new king; where does “Governor Boris” come in? After all, he is presumed to have borne no relation to the royal family. A fealty to this “governor’s” children seems even more absurd.

There is nothing odd about it in our reconstruction – the country swore fealty to Czar Boris, the son of the deceased Czar Fyodor, as well as the royal bloodline, or the children of Boris.

2.5. Could Czar Boris “Godunov” have been a son of Fyodor Ivanovich, a minor landlord?

What do historians tell us about the origins of “Godunov”? Traditionally, Boris Godunov is presumed to have been a son of a certain “Fyodor Ivanovich the landlord”, a perfectly obscure figure ([777], page 5). We see his father identified as Fyodor Ivanovich once again! As for the “obscurity” of this figure – it is quite obvious that learned historians

cannot find any other historical character bearing the name of Fyodor Ivanovich except for the Czar, whom they simply cannot suspect of having been the father of “Godunov”. Hence their proclamation that Fyodor Ivanovich, the father of the next Czar, or “Godunov”, had really been a minor landlord. Moreover, we are told that when “the authorities of Moscow compiled the list of the ‘thousand best servants’, which included the most distinguished aristocrats of the epoch, neither Fyodor, nor his brother Dmitriy Ivanovich Godunov, were included in this list” ([777], page 6). Historians are trying to find an explanation for this fact: “they were expunged from the narrow circle of the boyar elite and became mere provincial aristocrats; this had precluded them from getting positions at the court and in the military” ([777], page 5). Thus, Czar Boris Godunov appears out of nowhere in the Millerian and Romanovian history – that is to say, his immediate predecessors had been anonymous members of nobility bearing no relation to the royal court of Moscow – upstarts, in other words.

On the other hand, we learn that “according to the evidence presented by his own chancellery, Boris had grown at the royal court, while his sister Irina was also raised at the court from the age of seven” ([777], page 6). We therefore learn that Irina Godunova had also been raised at the royal court of Moscow. Then she married the heir apparent, Czar Fyodor Ivanovich, and became Czarina.

Our opinion is as follows: the paternal ancestors of Boris “Godunov” had been Russian Czars, and not some anonymous clan of lacklustre landlords. In particular, Fyodor Ivanovich, the father of Boris, had been Czar, and therefore could not be listed among his own “best servants” – the royal chancellery did not write absurdities in official records.

Real documents testifying to the royal origins of Boris must have been destroyed by the Romanovs when they came to power for reasons explained below. However, a few traces did in fact survive: “the family [of the Godunovs – Auth.] was presumably founded by Chet-Murza the Tartar, who is said to have come to Russia under Ivan Kalita. His existence is mentioned in a single record – “The Tale of Chet”. However, this record is relatively recent in origins [as learned historians hasten to assure us – Auth.]. The tale was compiled by the monks from the parochial Ipatyevskiy




Fig. 9.3. The “oriental throne” of Boris Godunov. End of the XVI century. Appears to reflect the style and the atmosphere of the Russian court of the Horde quite well. Taken from [550], page 101.

monastery in Kostroma, which had housed the family sepulchre of the Godunovs”. Skrynnikov hastens to calm the reader saying that the monks “had written the tale in order to manufacture some historical evidence that the dynasty of Boris had been of princely origins and to link the new dynasty to their monastery. The scribes of the Ipatyevskiy monastery claimed that Chet had founded an Orthodox friary in Kostroma on his way from Saray to Moscow ... ‘The Tale of Chet’ is full of historical absurdities and isn’t to be trusted in the least” ([777], page 5).

One must however remember the time when Kostroma, located right next to Yaroslavl, had been the imperial capital, *qv* above. This is where the Russian Horde dynasty had come from. The historians have no reason to criticise the monks of the Ipatyevskiy monastery – the latter were perfectly right to state that the Godunov dynasty had been founded by one of the closest allies of Ivan Kalita = Caliph = Batu-Khan, the founded of the royal Russian dynasty of the horde.

In fig. 9.3 we see a luxurious throne that had belonged to Boris Godunov. The throne looks “very Oriental” in style. Historians are trying to convince us that the throne in question was made in Iran and given to Boris as a present by Shah Abbas I at the end of the XVI century ([550], page 100). The throne is therefore said to be of a foreign origin; however, one finds this version somewhat off. We are being told that the throne of the great Russian Czar, or Khan, was imported from a distant land and not made locally, as though the Muscovite craftsmen had lacked the skills necessary for making such a throne. We are of the opinion that Godunov’s “oriental throne” simply reflects the style that was common for the Russian court of the XVI century, and must be credited to the Russian craftsmen. It is however possible that the imperial craftsmen weren’t all based in the capital of the empire, and could have lived in faraway reaches of the Empire – Iran, for instance. The throne could indeed have been brought from afar; however, the craftsmen had made it for the Great Czar, or Khan, of Russia (the Horde) – their lord and sovereign, and not a ruler of some distant land.

2.6. The role of Boris “Godunov” during the reign of Czar Ivan and Czar Fyodor

According to the Romanovian history, Boris Godunov had possessed tremendous influence over the Czar in the last years of Ivan the Terrible as regnant monarch. Boris had been “the de facto ruler” at the end of Ivan’s reign as well as during the ensuing reign of Fyodor. Boris was representing the entire Godunov clan in the eyes of the Romanovian historians, a clan they had wholeheartedly loathed. However, let us turn to some of the old documents for evidence.

Let us enquire about the official rank of Boris Godunov under Ivan the Terrible. It turns out that there had been no such rank – other Godunovs (Dmitriy and Stepan) did in fact hold some of the key positions at the court; however, there isn’t a single word uttered about Boris anywhere. Moreover, when “Ivan the Terrible” was dying, he had “entrusted his son and his family to the members of the Duma mentioned in his testament” ([777], page 16). Had Boris Godunov been the “de facto ruler”, he would naturally have been included in this list. This is so obvious that

Skrynnikov openly tells us: “it is usually presumed that Boris Godunov had been made head of the custodians’ council by the Czar” ([777], page 16). However, this turns out to be untrue. Skrynnikov proceeds to tell us that a critical analysis of the sources “exposed the fallacy of this opinion ... He [Ivan the Terrible – Auth.] does not mention Boris Fyodorovich once in said testament ... Nor does he mention any office Godunov was appointed to” ([777], pages 16-17). Boris Godunov occupies no official rank during the reign of Fyodor, either – Romanovian historians refer to him as to the brother-in-law of the Czar.

All of these oddities are easy enough to explain – Boris occupies no office being the heir apparent who already bore the title of the Czar. This is the highest office possible, and he would naturally have no need for any lower.

2.7. The famous legend about the “lengthy pleas for Boris to ascend the throne” as a political myth that dates from the epoch of the Romanovs

The famous legend about Czar Boris ascending to the throne is well familiar to most Russians in a number of renditions, A. S. Pushkin’s being the most famous. He is supposed to have refused for a long time, retreated to a monastery and feigned utter reluctance to get involved in the affairs of state. The boyars and the common folk pled for Boris to become crowned Czar many a time, and to no avail – he kept on refusing, claiming to have no rights for the throne, and only acquiesced after a long and arduous period of pleas and imploration. All of this is related in a certain group of sources, which are known quite well to have been written by pro-Romanovian authors ([777]).

However, there is other surviving evidence of non-Romanovian nature and reflecting reality a great deal more accurately in our opinion. As we have seen above, Fyodor entrusted the state to Boris and Czarina Irina. The latter decided to retreat to a nunnery shortly afterwards: “It had been a most memorable day when the townspeople had summoned the Czarina to the square ... her brother Boris had been the next to make a speech; he proclaimed himself the next governor, and the boyars his subjects, likewise the princes. This is how Michael Schiel, an Austrian envoy,

rendered the speech of Godunov; there is an official document written in April of the same year wherein the event is recorded. This document tells us that Boris “would act together with the boyars and in the interests of the latter to an even greater extent than he had done previously” ([777], page 109).

We can therefore see that Boris did not refuse the throne – furthermore, he considers it obvious that the boyars are to assist him with the matters of the state – the formula “together with the boyars” was standard and used by Czars during inauguration.

We believe the latter group of sources to be in better concurrence with reality – the young Czar Boris remains on his throne alone, unassisted by the mother, takes the entire power into his hands and assures the people that he would instigate no changes and rule together with the boyars, as he had done before.

It has to be pointed out that these records must have survived due to their being of a foreign origin and therefore beyond the reach of the Romanovian censors.

The Moscow documents of the Romanovian epoch relate the events in an altogether different manner – one that became reflected in history textbooks and even operas: “The compilers of the chronicle’s final edition make the speech of Boris sound completely different – he is supposed to have abdicated in favour of the patriarch” ([777], page 109).

A certain confusion is supposed to have followed. Our reconstruction makes it perfectly easy to understand – Czar Boris had still been very young and lacked the necessary experience and *savoir-faire*. There must have been other claimants – the Shouyskiys, who had naturally tried to wrest the throne away from Boris: “the power struggle had split the Duma of the boyars in two ... the two parties became so hostile towards each other that Boris was forced to leave his residence in the Kremlin and move out of town. He found shelter in the Novodevichiy monastery, which had been well-fortified” ([777], pages 110-111).

It is amazing how nimbly the Romanovian historians alter the interpretation and assessment of events, keeping the factual data intact for the most part. A perfectly obvious and natural action of the young Czar (seeking temporary refuge in a well-fortified monastery) was presented to the posterity as a cun-

ning ploy of “Godunov”, the old weaver of intrigues, who had retreated to the monastery tactically, in order to claim the state for himself a short while later. This scenario is reflected well in Mussorgsky’s opera “Boris Godunov”; however, it has got nothing in common with reality.

Skrynnikov is familiar with the documents perfectly well, and he tells us that the facts “demonstrate official statements that claim Boris to have fled the city out of his own accord to be untrustworthy” ([777], page 112). This is in perfect correspondence with our reconstruction.

The party of Boris proved victorious, and had really come after him to the monastery in order to take the new monarch to the already pacified Kremlin ([777], pages 113-120).

2.8. The age of Czar Boris at the time of his demise

It is traditionally assumed that Boris Godunov was born in 1552 ([777], page 5), and ascended to the throne aged 47, in 1599. However, the surviving portraits of Czar Boris depict him as a very young man (see the two portraits in [777], fig. 9.4). Furthermore, Boris is presumed to have been 53 years of age when he died in 1605, and his heir had allegedly been a young child.

According to our reconstruction, Boris had been born a few good decades later, being the son of Fyodor Ivanovich. Boris may have been around 20 or 25 years of age at the time of his ascension to the throne in 1599. It is therefore most likely that Boris had been substantially younger than the Millerian and Romanovian version suggests; the son of Boris must have been very young at the time of his father’s death.

3. THE GREAT STRIFE. Czar Dmitriy Ivanovich, also known as Lzhedmitriy – the false Dmitriy

3.1. The unsolved enigma of the Russian history

“The Russian historical reports that render the biography of the young Prince Dmitriy remain thoroughly enigmatic to date. He is known to us as “The



Fig. 9.4. Portrait of the Great Czar, or Khan, Boris “Godunov” dating from the XVII century. Godunov looks like a Tartar owing to the efforts of the Romanovs. Taken from [777], inset between pages 64 and 65. See also [578], Book 2, page 695.

Impostor” ... who had been certain of his royal bloodline from childhood ... “Dimitriy” had been raised by the boyar family of the Romanovs, and then handed over to the authorities of a monastery for further education. He became initiated into the clergy, and soon made deacon by Patriarch Iov ... A short while later, “Dimitriy”, known as Grigoriy, told a fellow friar that he had been the young prince, miraculously saved in Ouglich. This became known to Godunov, who gave orders for Grigoriy to be exiled to the Solovki. Grigoriy decided to flee instead of getting exiled, managed to fool his guards and headed towards Lithuania. He had surfaced in Putivl, where he was received by Archimandrite Spasskiy, and gone to Lithuania afterwards” ([183], Volume 2, page 95).

Grigoriy went to Kiev next, where he had made his claim about being of a royal bloodline. He was introduced to Sigismund, King of Poland, who had allowed Grigoriy “the draft of volunteers for his army, and conceded to pay their allowance. Grigoriy moved

into the castle of Prince Mniszek. An anti-Godunovian force had emerged” ([183], Volume 2, page 96).

We have recollected the most important facts from the beginning of Dmitriy’s biography, which had always left the researchers with a very odd impression indeed. A typical comment of a historian is quoted below.

“The shadow of the innocent victim whose identity remains unidentified to date, known to history as *Lzhedmitriy* (false Dmitriy), had brought a sudden end to all of Godunov’s plans and swept the throne clean, riding the crest of historical momentum. This had resulted in a great devastation, a civil war that raged on for years, and a horrendous deal of bloodshed. What real powers could have driven the impersonation of Prince Dmitriy’s ghost and made him strong enough to oppose Boris Godunov, who had already sat firmly upon his throne, been recognized by the Civil Council, and an experienced ruler to boot, not to mention his exceptional intelligence and energy, unparalleled by anyone in his entourage?” ([183], Volume 2, page 97).

Our conception makes all the facts related above easily understood. The so-called “false Dmitriy”, or “Dmitriy the Impostor” had indeed been the son of Czar Ivan, namely, Ivan Ivanovich, regnant between 1563 and 1572 and then dethroned, *qv* above. Let us remind the reader that Ivan Ivanovich himself had been raised by the family of the Zakharyins (Romanovs), who had ruled on his behalf due to the young age of their monarch. This is why his son Dmitriy (known as *Lzhedmitriy*) had also been raised by the Romanovs. The young prince had to take the vows, so as to make his potential claims for the throne invalid in accordance with the old Russian tradition.

However, the reader might recollect the fact that Prince Dmitriy is supposed to have been murdered in Ouglich. One must also bear in mind that there were two tragic deaths during the reign of “Ivan the Terrible” – presumably of two different princes bearing the same name of Dmitriy Ivanovich. Both are children of “Ivan the Terrible”. We already mentioned the two deaths above, the first one a result of a nanny’s negligence and the second, the famous Ouglich Tragedy.

We are of the opinion that there was a single death of a young prince – the version about Dmitriy killed in Ouglich is more recent and dates to the XVII cen-

tury, the epoch of the Great Strife. The authors were trying to represent Prince Dmitriy Ivanovich, alive and claiming the throne for himself, an impostor.

According to our reconstruction, the young Czar Dmitriy Ivanovich had died tragically in 1563, aged ten. Historians are of the opinion that he had died in his infancy. The “Ouglich Tragedy” version was made up by Shouyskiy, who had been the first to declare Dmitriy an impostor. The real grave of the young Czar Dmitriy Ivanovich had been declared the grave of the very Prince Dmitriy Ivanovich who had opposed Shouyskiy. This is how Dmitriy Ivanovich became falsely known as an impostor.

The Romanovs had already sided with Shouyskiy, and must have taken the story further, using it for their own ends. Bear in mind that the “Ouglich Tragedy” has the name of Shouyskiy written all over it, since he had been investigating the case, according to the documents. What do we see? Skrynnikov tells us openly: “We have suspected the original of the ‘Ouglich file’ to have been tampered with – we instantly see that someone has altered the order of pages in the file and purloined the introductory part” ([777], page 70).

Further also: “Prince Shouyskiy had been in charge of the investigation in Ouglich ... The investigators were confused by the fact that Shouyskiy had given contradictory evidence several times” ([777], page 72). Moreover, “there is an opinion that the surviving Ouglich materials are an edited copy, which was compiled in Moscow ... No drafts of this document have reached our age” ([777], page 71). Thus, the entire Ouglich case might have been fabricated in Moscow. Skrynnikov concludes as follows: “There are reasons to believe the Ouglich materials to have fallen prey to a retrospective estimation of the events related therein” ([777], page 72).

3.2. The boyar plot against Czar Boris

We shall give a brief overview of how Dmitriy, aka “*Lzhedmitriy*”, came to power, without delving deep into the details – we must however emphasise the fact that he became crowned after a coup d’état plotted by the boyars against Czar Boris, who had been poisoned: “On 13 April [1605 – Auth.] he had attended a Duma assembly and dined afterwards. He felt ill as soon as he had left the dining hall; his mouth

and nostrils started to bleed, he was promptly forced to take the monastic vows and baptised Bogolepa, and died two hours later” ([183], Volume 2, pages 113-114). This had been the second attempt of the Boyars to dethrone Czar Boris – a successful one this time. The coup d’état was masterminded by the same boyar clans of the Shouyskiys, the Golitsyns and the Romanovs. Further events show that Prince Dmitriy had merely served them as a tool – the very same people had tried to kill him in less than a year (successfully, according to historical science; we are of a different opinion, *qv* below). Shouyskiy, who had long been plotting for the throne, became Czar.

3.3. The “false Dmitriy” as the real Prince Dmitriy, son of Czar Ivan

The Romanovian course of Russian history made us certain that the so-called “*Lzhedmitriy*” had indeed been an impostor – a certain “Grishka Otrepyev”, man with no name. Historians of the Romanovian epoch have been so persistent in repeating this that it has taken on the appearance of an obvious and self-implying fact. Below we shall tell the reader about their motivations.

That which seems so obvious to us today had been anything but obvious to the contemporaries of the “false Dmitriy” 400 years ago. Everyone who saw him recognized Dmitriy as the real prince – the Polish aristocracy and the King of Poland, the Russian Boyars, and, finally, his own mother Czarina Maria Nagaya, already a nun and re-baptised Marfa ([777] and [183], Volume 2). Dmitriy had started to send out “decrees calling all Russians to gather under his banners already from Putivl. He had 18 cities in his hands, and the sympathies of the residents of an area that measured 600 verst from the West to the East, who had all recognized him as the real prince. The real Otrepyev was called to Putivl by Dmitriy and shown to the public” ([183], Volume 2, page 113).

“The first thing Dmitriy has done upon arriving in Moscow had been taking measures to rescue his mother, the nun Marfa, back from her monastic incarceration” (*ibid*). It turns out that she was questioned under Czar Boris and had declared her son to be alive, which resulted in her incarceration at the Troitse-Sergiyev Monastery, with a large body of

guards to watch over her” (*ibid*). Dmitriy had met his mother with a great many people present: “No one had a shred of doubt about the man upon the throne being the real son of Czar Ivan. Marfa was placed at the Voskresenskiy Monastery and surrounded with the utmost care and attention; Dmitriy would visit her every day, and linger for several hours” ([183], Volume 2, page 116). Furthermore, it turns out that Dmitriy had secretly met his mother, Maria Nagaya, even before his escape to Lithuania, in a monastery at Vyksa. This fact is reflected in the famous chronicle entitled “*Inoye Skazaniye*” (literally, “a different tale” – see [777], page 159). Skrynnikov naturally considers these data to be of a “completely figmental nature” (*ibid*). However, our reconstruction suggest a natural explanation of all these implausible facts.

3.4. The Romanovs as the authors of the version that claimed Dmitriy to have been an impostor

We are explaining obvious facts here – one may well wonder why historians refuse to believe numerous evidence left by contemporaries about Dmitriy being the real son of Ivan, declaring all the eyewitnesses fools and liars? Bear in mind that the final version of the Russian history was written under the Romanovs, whose motivations for declaring Dmitriy an impostor are very easy to see through – Dmitriy, who became Czar, had a son called “the infant thief” by the Romanovian historians; this child should have become the next Czar. However, the Romanovs had other plans for the throne. They usurped power when the son of Dmitriy had still been alive, which renders the election of Mikhail Romanov, the next Czar, illicit, since the son of Dmitriy, the previous Czar, had still been alive. The only option for the Romanovs had been to declare Dmitriy an impostor, which they hastened to do. The existence of a nobly born heir had been another problem, which the Romanovs solved by hanging the young boy on the Spasskiye Gate.

The brief corollaries of our reconstruction are as follows:

- 1) The Romanovs had usurped power and murdered the true heir to the throne, the son of Czar Dmitriy.
- 2) The history of this epoch was written much later, already under the Romanovs.

3) Declaring Dmitriy an impostor had served a double purpose – to conceal the illicit election of Mikhail Romanov and to escape accusations of regicide (the murder of an “impostor’s” son naturally cannot be classified as such).

This is one of the most complex moments in Russian history, and the dawn of the Romanovian dynasty. The Romanovs needed to prove the legitimacy of their reign, and this problem had been solved with the simplest means available.

Of course, convincing everyone at once had been an impossible task. In Poland, pamphlets aimed at discrediting Mikhail Fyodorovich Romanov had remained in circulation up until the XVII century – in particular, he was called “Fyodorovich the Chieftain” and “the so-called Great Prince” ([437], page 414). The Romanovs would obviously need to nip the consequences of this embarrassing and dangerous evidence spreading further in the bud. Indeed, “in the beginning of 1650 the Czar [Alexei Mikhailovich Romanov – Auth.] sent the boyar Grigoriy Pushkin accompanied by a party of other boyars to Warsaw with a diplomatic mission ... according to Pushkin, ‘His Royal Majesty demands to collect all of the perfidious books and to burn them in the presence of the envoys, and to punish the typesetters, the printers, the owners of the publishing houses where the books were printed, and the landlords who owned the land where these houses had stood, by death’ ([437], page 416). We can see that the objectives pursued by the Romanovs in the alteration of history had been anything but philosophical or abstract – they intended to keep supreme power in their hands and evade possible punishment, which made all means acceptable.

3.5. The plot of the boyars and the murder of Czar Dmitriy, known as “Lzhedmitriy the First”.

When we were relating our reconstruction above, we emphasised the fact that Prince Dmitriy was made Czar as a result of a plot. The boyars had killed Czar Boris and crowned Dmitriy. However, Prince Dmitriy had served the purpose of an intermediate ruler – the conspiracy was presided over by Shouyskiy, who had craved the throne for himself. This made Prince Dmitriy an obstacle; shortly after the inauguration of

the latter, a palace revolution takes place. Dmitriy is presumed to have been killed as a result. The throne is taken by Vassily Shouyskiy.

The Romanovs must have sided with Shouyskiy, the leader of the conspiracy, since Fyodor Romanov, later known as Patriarch Filaret, was brought back from his exile and appointed Patriarch of Moscow.

3.6. The reasons for the cremation of the “false Dmitriy’s” body

Cremation had not existed in Russia back in the day – neither friends or foes got cremated, there had simply been no such tradition. And yet the body of “*Lzhedmitriy I*” was cremated for some reason. This event is unique in Russian history – why would anyone have to cremate the body of a former ruler? The body of an enemy could be desecrated, exhumed and so on – why would anyone want to cremate it?

The events are reported in the following manner. The body of the “false Dmitriy” was dragged from the palace outside: “The corpse was mutilated to the extent of looking barely human, let alone recognizable ... The crowd had stopped at the Voznesenskiy monastery and called out princess Marfa, demanding her to identify the body as that of her son. One of the reports claims her to have given a sharp negative reply, another – that she gave the following enigmatic response: ‘Your lot had better asked me when he was still alive – he is no son of mine now that he’s dead’. Yet another evidence taken from the Jesuit records reports that the mother had told the mob dragging the corpse that they should know better, and, upon being threatened, told them explicitly that the body had not belonged to her son” ([436], pages 273-274).

It is therefore obvious that the response given by the Czarina does not imply a positive identification of the body as that of her son; moreover, her words can be interpreted as a negative identification of the body as that of a stranger.

We are of the opinion that Czar Dmitriy had not been killed and managed to elope. The body shown to Czarina Marfa had belonged to someone else – hence the mutilations beyond the stage of identification. The body was cremated so as to cover the traces completely ([436], page 288).

Czar Dmitriy appears to have survived this plot; we should therefore expect him to re-emerge on the historical arena. Indeed, we learn of a “*Lzhedmitriy II*” emerging in Putivl, where the former headquarters of Dmitriy I had been. The first “false Dmitriy” had been seen by a multitude of people – those very crowds recognized him as Czar Dimitriy once again! “Shakhovskoy had gathered a great many people around himself and the new contestant in Putivl, claiming the mutineers to have murdered some German in Moscow and not Dimitriy, whom he proclaimed alive. He was urging the masses to rise against the tyranny of Shouyskiy” ([183], Volume 2, page 125).

3.7. “*Lzhedmitriy II*” as Czar Dmitriy, also known as “*Lzhedmitriy I*”

“The advent of a new Dimitriy had scared Shouyskiy so much that he had told the troops he sent against him that the enemies were German invaders and not mere mutineers; however, the ruse became exposed when the two armies met” ([183], Volume 2, page 126). First, “*Lzhedmitriy II*” went to Castle Mniszek in Poland, where his alleged predecessor had once been received as a refugee and where his wife, Marina Mniszek, had resided. It is most significant that she recognized “*Lzhedmitriy II*” as her husband; moreover, when the troops of the latter had approached Moscow and became quartered at Tushino, Marina and her father, Prince Mniszek, rejoined with him, moving there from Moscow. Marina declared this very Dmitriy to be her husband. Historians find this highly suspicious – after all, they “know for certain” that the person in question had been someone entirely different. Why could Marina be utterly ignorant of this fact? The explanation offered by historical science is that Marina had been acting under the pressure of her father, conceding to play her role with great reluctance ([183], Volume 2, page 134). They also tell us that Marina, despite having agreed to her role of “the false Dmitriy’s” wife, blatantly refused to consummate the marriage (*ibid*). One might wonder about the source of this knowledge, especially seeing as how she soon gave birth to the son of “*Lzhedmitriy II*” (who was instantly dubbed “the infant thief” by the Romanovs, cf. the nickname they gave to his father – “The Thief from Tushino”).



Fig. 9.5. Old portrait of Marina Mniszek. Dates from the early XVII century, or supposed to have been painted during her lifetime. Taken from [234].

This very child had been murdered by the Romanovs afterwards – hanged upon the Spasskiye Gate, the objective being the removal of an unnecessary obstacle from their way to the throne.

The further actions of Marina Mniszek also become perfectly clear – she refused to leave Russia after the death of “*Lzhedmitriy II*” and continued to struggle for the Russian throne, aided by the troops headed by Zaruskiy that had still been loyal to her. There is nothing odd about this fact – she had known her son to be the rightful heir of Dimitriy, the true Czar, for certain. Had his father been an anonymous “thief from Tushino”, it would make sense for her to leave the country and head homewards, to Poland, away from the menace presented by an entire country in a state of upheaval. She had this opportunity, but she did not use it, turning towards the Cossacks from Volga, Don and Yaik instead ([183], Volume 2, page 158). The proud and brave woman was defending her own rights and those of her son, heir to the Russian throne of the Horde by birthright.

This was followed by a war between Marina aided by the troops of Zaruskiy and the Romanovs – one of the most obscure places in Russian history. The modern rendition of this war is most likely to have been thought up by the Romanovs, who had won ([436], pages 769-778). Romanovian historians present it as a war between the Romanovs, lawful rulers of the state, and the “thieves”.

Nevertheless, Kostomarov reports that Zarutskiy “had been misnaming himself Czar Dmitriy Ivanovich” ([436], page 770). Kostomarov is genuinely surprised to tell us that official documents “were written in this name and given to Zarutskiy, which is genuinely odd, seeing as how the warlord had been known to a great many Russians” ([436], page 770).

It is possible that Czar Dmitriy Ivanovich had still been alive, in which case the Romanovs killed him later, with his death represented as the execution of Zarutskiy. This suspicion is made stronger by the fact that “a second Zarutskiy” emerged right after the execution – there is no prior mention of him anywhere. The person in question is said to have been the Ataman of Cherkessian Cossacks from Malorossiia, “a certain Zakhar Zarutskiy – possibly, a brother of Ivan, or one of his relations” ([436], page 779). Kostomarov has nothing but guesswork to rely upon insofar as the identity of the “second Zarutskiy” is concerned and whether or not the “first Zarutskiy” had any brothers. It is however most likely that there had been a single Zarutskiy, and Czar Dmitriy Ivanovich of the Horde had remained by the side of Marina Mniszek – later re-baptized Zarutskiy by the Romanovs, who needed to drive away the accusations of regicide.

The army of Zarutskiy (Czar Dmitriy?) and Marina Mniszek were defeated. The Romanovs, who had already settled in the capital city of Moscow, managed to split apart the Cossack alliance, which was forming around Marina and Zarutskiy, and make sure the Shah of Persia would remain neutral ([436], page 779).

Zarutskiy (Czar Dmitriy Ivanovich?) and Marina were seized by the troops of Mikhail Romanov at Yaik. The former had been impaled. The four-year-old prince, son of Dmitriy and Marina, was hanged in Moscow by the Romanovs ([183], Volume 2, page 159; see also [436], page 778). As we have already explained, the Romanovs had thus put an end to the old Russian dynasty of the Horde.

4.

THE WAR AGAINST STEPAN TIMOFEYEVICH RAZIN AND THE VICTORY OF THE ROMANOVS

The above implies that the history of the famous “revolt of Razin” is most likely to have been distorted to a great extent as well. A study of the epoch’s doc-

uments makes this suspicion of ours ever greater. Let us relate a number of preliminary considerations on this matter.

It is presumed that some 60 years after the ascension of the Romanovs to power a great mutiny broke out in Russia – it is known as the “Mutiny of Razin”, or the “Peasant War” nowadays. The peasants and the Cossacks have presumably rebelled against the landlords and the Czar. The Cossacks were the backbone of Razin’s military power. The revolt had engulfed a large part of the Russian empire, but was stifled by the Romanovs eventually.

There are no original documents of the defeated party that have survived – it is presumed that only about seven or six of them have reached our day and age; however, historians add that only one of them is authentic ([101], pages 8 and 14). We are of the opinion that this single presumed original is also highly suspicious and looks very much like a draft, as one can plainly see from the photocopy in [441], Volume 2, Part 1, Document 53. Historians themselves believe this document to “have been compiled by Razin’s allies the atamans, and not Razin himself – and a long way away from the Volga to boot” ([101], page 15). Razin’s headquarters were in the Volga region. Moreover, the name Razin may have originally stood for “*ra-syn*”, or “Son of Ra” – “Son of Volga”, in other words, seeing as how the river had also been known under the name Ra.

Romanovian historians claim that a certain impostor had accompanied the army of Razin – Prince Alexei, who is presumed to have impersonated the deceased son of Czar Alexei Mikhailovich Romanov. Razin had allegedly acted on behalf of this Great Prince. Historians claim Razin to have done this on purpose, trying to make the war against the Romanovs look lawful ([101]).

Moreover, we are told that a certain patriarch had accompanied the army of Razin. There were opinions that the latter identifies as none other but Patriarch Nikon, who had been deposed around that time. For instance, B. Coijet, the secretary of the Dutch embassy who visited Moscow in 1676, 5 years after the war, describes “two boats upholstered in red and black velvet, which had presumably belonged to Prince Alexei and Patriarch Nikon” ([101], page 319).

However, all this information has reached us

through the filter of the Romanovian chancellery, which must have planted the version that the war with Razin had been a mere uprising of the Cossacks. V. I. Bouganov refers to the multi-volume academic collection of documents about the revolt of Razin ([441]) telling us that the majority of documents “have been prepared by the government ... Hence the terminology we encounter – “thieves” etc, tendentious rendition of facts, *suppressio veri* and outright mendacities” ([101], page 7). It is therefore possible that the names of the prince and the patriarch (Alexei and Nikon) have also been invented by the Romanovian chancellery, possibly in lieu of other names that were to be erased from the memory of the Russian people.

It turns out that the Romanovs have even prepared a special decree containing an official version of the revolt ([101], page 31). A propos, this decree contains an amazingly absurd interpretation of Razin’s documents. We learn of the following:

“The perfidious epistles of the thieves claiming the Great Prince Alexei Alexeyevich, righteous son of the Czar ... to be alive, and heading from the South of Volga towards Kazan and Moscow, presumably at the orders of our royal majesty the Czar in order to punish the boyars, the members of the Duma and the state officials in Moscow and other cities ... for their alleged treachery” ([101], page 31).

The same information is presented in an altogether different manner in the few surviving copies of Razin’s documents. Let us quote a fragment of the missive sent by one of Razin’s atamans to his comrades-in-arms. The original was naturally destroyed; all we have at our disposal is an “exact copy made from the perfidious decree of the thieves” in the Romanovian camp to be sent to Moscow: “May you stand fast in defence of Our Lady, the Great Czar, the Patriarch, Stepan Timofeyevich and all the Orthodox Christian faith” ([441], Volume 2, part 1, page 252, document 207).

Here’s another example. V. I. Bouganov quotes the epistle sent to the city of Kharkov by “the great army of the Don and Alexei Grigoryevich”. Razin’s allies wrote the following: “On 15 October of the present year of 179, we, the Great Army of the Don set forth, by the order of the Great Czar ... [followed by the full title of the Czar – V. Bouganov] and by his decree, to serve the Great Czar ... so as we all might survive the treachery of the boyars” ([101], pages 27-28).

To encapsulate the above, Razin’s army set forth under the banners of the Great Czar against the mutinous boyars in Moscow. Nowadays it is suggested that the naive Razin’s army wanted to protect Alexei Mikhailovich, the unfortunate Muscovite Czar, from the treachery of his own boyars. We consider this hypothesis quite absurd.

Do we find the information about the Great Czar being Alexei, son of Alexei Mikhailovich, anywhere in Razin’s documents? We do not – more often than not, they simply refer to the Great Czar ([441]). The surviving Romanovian copies of Razin’s documents either omit the name of the Czar altogether, or replace it by the name of Alexei Mikhailovich – see [441], in particular, document 60 in Volume 2, part 2. The Romanovian version is therefore trying to tell us that Razin’s decrees contain the orders of Alexei Mikhailovich, the regnant Czar from Moscow, sent to his son and demanding the latter to set forth with his army against his own father. An even more absurd version is that he had led his own army against himself. These preposterous data must result from several poorly coordinated editions of Razin’s documents made by the Romanovian chancellery. We shall relate our hypothesis about the true identity of this Great Czar, on whose behalf Razin’s epistles were written, below.

The official Romanovian version related in the abovementioned decree must have also been used in the numerous accounts of the war with Razin left by foreigners. Apparently, foreign envoys were instructed to adhere to a certain version (see the overview of foreign reports in [101]). The Romanovs were rather vehement in planting their versions: “One of the decrees, known ... as the ‘royal prototype’ ... contains a detailed official version of Razin’s revolt ... Local authorities were given orders to repeatedly read this decree aloud in front of assembly halls for all the populace to hear” ([101], page 247). Apparently, this was done to record the official version in people’s memory.

However, multiple official readings must have been insufficient, and there were dissenting individuals. The almanac ([441]) contains a curious edict of the Czar Alexei Mikhailovich sent to “Smolensk, our fatherland” with orders to execute a simple soldier for some enigmatic phrase that he had uttered. This

phrase had unsettled Alexei so much that he ordered for the soldier to be “hanged as an example for others to refrain from repeating the words of the pilferers” ([441], Volume 2, part 2, page 149). We also learn that “the materials left from the questioning of Ivashka were burnt by the government official Ivan Savastianovich Bolshoi Khitrovo at the personal orders of the Czar ... so that the unseemly words would remain unknown to the people” ([441], Volume 2, part 2, page 149). Bear in mind that the official who was entrusted with the incineration of the “questioning materials” of a simple soldier had a patronymic ending with “*vich*”; this formula was only used for referring to the administrative elite back in the day (see [101], page 119).

The victory of the Romanovs had been an arduous one. The Leipzig press of that time reported that Razin had “proclaimed himself Czar of both domains [Kazan and Astrakhan – Auth.]; many powerful troops ‘fell under his influence’. The Czar is so frightened that he doesn’t dare to send his army against Razin” ([101], page 329). It had taken the Romanovs a great deal of time and effort to change the course of the war in their favour.

There is evidence of Western European mercenaries being part of the Romanovian army that had eventually defeated Razin ([441]). The Romanovs had considered Russian and Tartar soldiers untrustworthy; there were many deserters among them, and some had even taken the side of Razin ([101], pages 230 and 232-233). On the contrary, the relations between Razin’s army and the foreigners had been strained. Cossacks had usually killed captive foreign mercenaries ([101], page 216).

Razin’s defeat can probably be partially explained by the fact that there had been very few factories that manufactured firearms and gunpowder in the south of Russia ([441]). Razin’s army was forced to rely on the cannons, guns and ammunition taken from the enemy as trophies ([101], pages 216-217). There is surviving evidence of the fact that they refused admittance to volunteers that had no rifles of their own ([101], pages 109-110).

Could that have been the primary reason of Razin’s defeat? This is rather unlikely. The issue of just how the Romanovs had managed to defeat the Horde led by Razin and later Pougachev requires a detailed

study nowadays, seeing as how the Horde had been supported by the overwhelming majority of the country’s populace, qv above.

According to our reconstruction, the famous “revolt” of Razin had really been a large-scale war between the two Russian states that emerged after the Great Strife of the early XVII century. It is usually presumed that in 1613 Mikhail Romanov became Czar of the entire Russia. This appears to be quite erroneous. Initially, the Romanovs had managed to gather the former lands of the White Russia and the northern parts of the Volga Region (Novgorod the Great, according to our reconstruction), their capital being Moscow. Southern Russia and even the Middle Volga had belonged to another state ruled by the Horde, with its capital in Astrakhan. This state must have had Czars of their own, whose bloodline ascended to the old Horde dynasty of Russia.

The Horde must have considered Romanovs usurpers of the throne, referring to them as to “traitors and thieves” ([101], page 29). Those who had sided with Razin had constantly claimed to be fighting “for the Czar against the boyars” ([441] and [101]). This must have meant that they did not recognize the boyar clan of the Romanov as rightful rulers of Russia. The Czar of the Horde must have resided in Astrakhan and been considered the Great Czar of All Russia by the allies of Razin.

“They [the followers of Razin – Auth.] had considered the actions of the government to be “thievery”, using the same terms for referring to the official documents ([101], page 29). The representatives of Razin are known to have “qualified the actions of the feudal camp [the Romanovs – Auth.] directed against their army and their policies on the territories that fell into their hands ... as ‘thievery’ and characterised the official documents in the same terms” ([101], page 13).

According to our reconstruction, the so-called “revolt of Razin” (1667-1671) had been a real war accompanied by a great deal of bloodshed. The Muscovite party had been led by Prince Dolgoroukiy ([101], page 21). His headquarters had been in Arzamas (*ibid*). The warlord of the Astrakhan army had been Stepan Timofeyevich Razin.

V. Bouganov reports the following: “The Russian revolt headed by Razin had created a great resonance

in Europe, the West in particular ... Foreign informers ... had often regarded Russian events [Razin's revolt – Auth.] as power struggle, calling them ‘the Tartar Insurrection’” ([101], page 326).

The entire history of the war between the Romanovs and Razin (Son of Ra?) is distorted and obscured to a tremendous extent. There are virtually no documents of Razin's party in existence – however, the precious few that have survived allow us to catch a glimpse of the real events of that epoch. We shall provide another quotation, wherein the words “prince” and “lawful” are put in question marks by modern historians due to the fact that they unwittingly regard the events in question through the distorting prism of the Romanovian history.

“The fourth question [of Alexei Mikhailovich to Razin during the questioning of the latter – Auth.] had been as follows: ‘Wherefore hast thou addressed Cherkasskiy as a royalty, and what hath he given you in return?’ ... The char is referring to another Cherkasskiy, most likely young Prince Andrei, son of Prince Kamboulat Pshimakhovich Cherkasskiy, the Kabardinian Murza. Prince Andrei was converted to the Orthodox faith and fell captive to Razin when the army of the latter had stormed Astrakhan. This character must have played the part of Prince Alexei, and accompanied Razin on his way northwards along the Volga. Razin had made a special boat for him and ordered to upholster it in red velvet. The ‘prince’ was playing the part of a ‘lawful’ ruler, quite naturally against his own will; inhabitants of the towns and cities caught in the wave of the insurrection would even swear fealty to him” ([101], page 119).

Our opinion is as follows: Stepan Timofeyevich Razin had been the military commander of the Great Czar of All Russia from the princely clan of Cherkasskiy. His capital had been in Astrakhan. The southern part of Russia must have become a separate state after the Great Strife of the early XVII century and the usurpation of power by the Romanovs in Moscow, with a Czar of its own, Astrakhan being its capital city. The exact identity of the Cherkasskiy who had been the Czar of Astrakhan is difficult to estimate, seeing as how the history of this period was radically rewritten by the Romanovs. Let us just point out two facts pertaining to the issue at hand.

1) It is known that Prince Grigoriy Souchaleye-




Fig. 9.5. Old portrait of Marina Mniszek. Dates from the early XVII century, or supposed to have been painted during her lifetime. Taken from [234].

vich Cherkasskiy, who had been “a warlord in Astrakhan” shortly before the war with Razin, had been “slain in his own domain” after the victory of the Romanovs, in 1672 ([770], page 218).

2) A certain Alexei Grigoryevich Cherkashenin, “ataman of the mutineers and sworn brother of S. Razin” had been active alongside Razin ([441], Volume 2, part 2, page 226). The name Cherkashenin might be a distorted version of the name Cherkasskiy.

Apparently, the Cherkasskiys had been an old Russian clan. They were considered to be the offspring of the Egyptian sultans, which is reflected in their coat of arms ([770], page 217; see fig. 9.6). As we demonstrate in CHRON5, the mediaeval Egyptian dynasty of the Mamelukes had been of a “Mongolian” (“Great”, or “Russian”) origin. It had even been known as “Cherkassian”, or Cossack. It is known that “the Cherkassian sultans reigned in Egypt between 1380 and 1517” ([99], page 745). Let us remind the reader that the Cherkassians had been another name of the Dnepr Cossacks in Russia ([101], page 27; see also [347], Volume 1, page 253).

The initial meaning of the word “Cherkassian” is all but forgotten nowadays. The historical Cherkassia is located in the vicinity of the Northern Caucasus

nowadays; it is also said that “at the end of the XV century ... its name becomes obliterated from historical sources” ([347], Volume 3, page 267). However, the word Cherkassians had been widely used in Russia for referring to the Dnepr Cossacks in order to distinguish between them and other Ukrainians (known as the *Malorossy*) up until the XVIII century ([347], Volume 3, page 272). Even the “Complete Collection of the Russian Imperial Laws still used the term Cherkassians [for referring to the Cossacks from the Dnepr region and Malorossiya, known as the Ukraine nowadays – Auth.] in 1766” ([347], Volume 3, page 272).

According to our understanding of the Russian history, the Egyptian sultans that emerged in the epoch of the “Mongolian” (Great Russian) and Ottoman (Ataman) conquest must have originated in Cherkassia, or Russia, and not the Northern Caucasus. This makes the Cherkasskiy clan Russian (Cossack) in its origin. This fact must still have been remembered in the XVII century.

The war with Razin had ended with the capture of Astrakhan, which we presume to have been the capital of the Southern Russian kingdom ruled by the Horde, which had eventually been conquered by the Romanovs. “A rebellious government had existed in Astrakhan for a long time after the imprisonment and the execution of Razin – up until November, 1671. Its primary figure of power had initially been V. Ous, and F. Sheloudyuk later on, after the death of the former, accompanied by other leaders” ([101], page 94).

Sheloudyuk had been known as “the new military commander of Astrakhan” in Moscow ([101], page 96). “In the summer of 1671 ... Sheloudyuk attempted to implement Razin’s plan [the conquest of Moscow – Auth.]. He had reached Simbirsk; however, he did not manage to make Razin’s plans a reality” ([101], page 96).

During the siege of Simbirsk by the Astrakhan army led by Fyodor Sheloudyuk, the warlords of Simbirsk “led by Sheremetev were sending official missives to Sheloudyuk known as *pamyati*; those had only been used between equal parties, be it individuals or institutions. Moreover, these decrees ... were said to have been written on behalf of the Czar, and their authenticity was confirmed by the royal seal” ([101], page 101).

The commander-in-chief of Simbirsk, who had been addressing Fyodor Sheloudyuk as an equal, “was a boyar, a member of the Boyar Duma and a representative of one of the most distinguished Russian families” ([101], page 101).

According to V. I. Bouganov’s commentary, “this situation ... is anything but typical for a peasant insurrection”.

The circumstances of the capture of Astrakhan are extremely obscure, likewise the entire history of the war against Razin. The latter had presumably been captured at Don as a result of betrayal. “The course of the investigation had been extremely hasty ... this fact, as well as the prompt execution, speaks volumes about the urgency of the matter as seen by the government; many foreign contemporaries report the same: the Czar and the boyars had feared the possibility of civil unrest in Moscow. Jacob Reutenfels, a foreigner and an eyewitness of the execution, writes that the Czar “had been in fear of an uprising, and gave orders ... for the square where the criminal [Razin – Auth.] was to be executed to be surrounded by a triple row of the most loyal soldiers. Only foreigners were allowed inside; there had been squadrons of armed soldiers at every crossroads in town” ([101], page 318).

The Romanovs had put a tremendous amount of effort into finding and destroying all the documents of Razin’s party save none. Frol, the younger brother of Razin, mentioned Razin burying a pitcher stuffed with documents ‘upon an island on River Don, at a large clearing near Prorva, underneath a pussy-willow’ ([101], page 62). Squadrons of the Romanovian troops have dug everywhere on the island leaving no stone unturned, searching the ground under every pussy-willow.

They had found nothing ([101]). Nevertheless, Frol had been kept alive for a long time, apparently with the purpose of extracting more explicit data about these documents from him. Bouganov reports that Frol had “taken the mystery of Razin’s documents with him to the grave. He was executed eventually, a few years later” ([101], page 62).

Some documents pertaining to the war against Razin must have survived in the archives of Kazan and Astrakhan ([101]). However, these archives vanished without a trace ([832], Volume 1, page 53).

5.

THE DESTRUCTION OF THE OLD IMPERIAL BOOKS OF RANKS BY THE ROMANOVS AND THE CREATION OF FALSE GENEALOGICAL DOCUMENTS TO REPLACE THEM

On 12 January 1682, in the reign of Fyodor Alexeyevich Romanov, the ancient Russian hierarchical structure was abolished ([27], page 40). “The books that contained hierarchical information were burnt” ([85], Volume 27, page 198). In particular, the famous “Books of Ranks” that had contained the records of appointments to governmental offices in Russia in the XV–XVI century were incinerated.

“The old hierarchical structure was known as *mestnichestvo* and governed the order of appointing the top ranking government officials ... in the XV–XVII century Russia. This order was based on the nobility of birth and the history of the hierarchical positions occupied by one’s ancestors who had served the Czars and the Great Princes ... Every appointment of a government official was made in accordance with this hierarchy and explicitly recorded in the ‘Books of Ranks’ ([85], Volume 27, page 198).

As we are beginning to understand, the hierarchical structure in question had applied to the entire Great = “Mongolian” Empire of Russia – the actual Horde as well as faraway provinces, from the British Isles to Japan. This structure is known to have been “a complex hierarchy, with the descendants of Rurik, or the Great Princes at the top [the descendants of the Great Prince Georgiy Danilovich, in other words, also known as Genghis-Khan – Auth.], as well as some of the Lithuanian princes Hediminovich. Below them were the descendants of local princes and the old boyar families of Moscow, and then the princes of smaller domains and provincial boyar families” ([85], Volume 27, page 198).

As we understand nowadays, the hierarchy had been topped by the descendants of the Czars from Vladimir and Suzdal, followed by the Vladimir and Suzdal Boyars. Next came the rulers of conquered lands, and then the local aristocracy. The order is perfectly natural for a large empire, which had integrated a vast number of new lands.

The “Books of Ranks” had therefore contained extremely valuable data pertaining to the history of the

Great = “Mongolian” Empire. It is quite obvious that these books would be the first candidates for incineration after the victory of the Romanovs over Razin. They were replaced by new ones, which had most likely been fraudulent from our point of view. There is excellent evidence to confirm this theory.

Let us turn to A. V. Antonov’s monograph entitled *The Genealogical Records of the Late XVII Century* published by the Russian State Archive of Ancient Documents ([27]). A. V. Antonov reports the following:

“The decision to abolish the *mestnichestvo* hierarchy, which was officially recorded in the edict of the Council dating from 12 January 1682 ... was accompanied by ... another edict of the government, ordering for the new genealogical records to be compiled. These records were supposed to include all strata of government officials that existed in that epoch ... All the work on the compilation of the genealogical books was entrusted to a genealogical commission ... appointed for this specific purpose, which later became known as the House of Genealogy ... Around the end of the 1680’s ... two genealogical books were compiled; one of them ... is known to us under the more recent name of ‘The Velvet Book’; the second remains lost to date” ([27], page 13).

Further also: “The genealogies of the late XVII century were sharply criticised in the work of P. N. Petrov entitled ‘The History of the Russian Aristocracy’ (St. Petersburg, 1886). The primary objects of the author’s criticisms are the introductory parts or family legends. Petrov considers all of them to be works of fiction compiled from chronicles and other sources” ([27], page 20).

N. P. Likhachyov conducted a research of the “Velvet Book” at the end of the XIX century. “He had been the first to raise the issue of the so-called compiled genealogies; a large number of the late XVII century records fall into this category” ([27], page 28). Likhachyov had discovered that the names “mentioned in these genealogical records were most often taken from sources available to the compiler, and then arbitrarily fashioned into genealogical trees; some of the names may be altogether fictitious” (*ibid*). For instance, in his study of the Golovkin genealogy Likhachyov demonstrates the compilers to be “ignorant of their own genealogical tree; they had used the records

of the Troitse-Sergiyev monastery and made ‘grave blunders’ in the chronological distribution of generations according to the patronymics of the recorded names” ([27], page 28).

The falsification of ancient documents appears to have been widely used for the validation of genealogical trees, especially seeing as how nobody had bothered with the verification of their integrity. According to a number of researchers, the House of Genealogy “did not verify the authenticity of genealogical documents” ([27], page 21). According to A. V. Antonov, “the scientist [N. P. Likhachyov – Auth.] had been primarily concerned with the exposure and criticism of the falsified and interpolated decrees that accompanied the genealogical records handed to the House officials. He considers the documents of the Izmaylovs, the Bedovs, the Protasyevs and the Chaadaevs to have been forgeries” ([27], page 28). According to S. B. Vesselovskiy, another researcher of the Romanovian genealogical records dating from the late XVII century, “most of the genealogical trees were compiled in an arbitrary manner and not based on the genealogical materials accumulated from generation to generation” ([27], page 32). In other words, the majority of the Romanovian genealogical trees were thought up at the end of the XVII century.

According to the observations made by A. A. Zimin, “the falsification of documents reached its peak at the end of the XVII century. Zimin associates this fact with the activity of the House of Genealogy ... Zimin demonstrates that whole sets of documents had been forged, and not just individual decrees” ([27], page 33).

As we are beginning to realise, the falsification of genealogy in the epoch of the first Romanovs had been but a single manifestation of the grandiose forgery and destruction of the books and documents containing the historical records of the Great = “Mongolian” Empire and its royal dynasty dating from epochs that predated the late XVI century.

By the way, what became of the second genealogical book compiled simultaneously with the “Velvet Book”? Had there been one in the first place? Nothing is known of its contents. Moreover, it turns out that a mere 60 years after its compilation, in 1741, the officials were already unable to find it: “The mention of this source [the second genealogical book – Auth.]

was noticed by the Heraldic Office as early as in 1741. A special enquiry was directed to the Moscow Chancellery of Heraldic Affairs” ([27], page 57). However, the second genealogical book could not be found in Moscow. The response to the enquiry had been as follows: “There are no other specific genealogical documents or decrees in existence”. A member of the Chancellery had been “sent to Moscow with the purpose of locating ... the second genealogical book and other documents of the Heraldic Office. However, neither the book, nor the documents have ever been found” ([27], page 58).

Our theory is as follows. The missing “second book” is the very same Velvet Book that exists to this day. Bear in mind that this name was coined a while later ([27], page 13). The missing (or destroyed) book is the first one. According to a decree of 1682, “the newly appointed genealogical commission was created in order to complement the old genealogical book and to compile four more ... However, another decree dating from 1686 only mentions two such books – a more complete version of the old one, and another book of an auxiliary nature” ([27], page 31).

It is presumed that the Velvet Book is the first genealogical book, whereas the compilation of the second “did not come to pass” ([27], page 31). However, the information we have about the distortion of the XVI century history by the Romanovian scribes in the XVII-XVIII century leads us to the suspicion that the old genealogical book was simply destroyed and not “complemented”, hence the non-existence of the first book. The “second” one must have been compiled from scratch, and then slyly presented as the complemented version of the original ancient genealogical book.

This suspicion explains a certain oddity inherent in the Royal Genealogical Book of the XVI century, which had not reached our age, obviously enough. However, certain allusions and fragments of evidence can give us some idea of what the book had looked like. N. P. Likhachyov was attempting to reconstruct the Royal Genealogical Book in the XIX century ([27], page 25). It turns out that the book in question had been quite peculiar from the point of view of Scaligerian and Romanovian history. For instance, the genealogy of Adashevskiy was included in the book; those had “hailed from a nondescript [according to Roma-

novian historians – Auth.] landlord family from Kostroma. On the other hand, the genealogies of some of the epoch’s most illustrious clans [from the Romanovian viewpoint, once again – Auth.] had not been included” ([27], page 25).

It is easy to realise that there’s nothing odd about this fact. According to our reconstruction, Kostroma, or the ancient Khoresmi, had been one of the Great = “Mongolian” Empire’s old capitals. Therefore, Adashev, “the landlord from Kostroma”, had hardly been “nondescript”. It is most likely that he had been one of the most distinguished aristocrats of Old Russia, or the Horde. On the contrary, many of “the epoch’s most illustrious clans” became such owing to nothing else but the Romanovian Velvet Book, which we have witnessed to be a forgery dating to the late XVII century. There was nothing illustrious about these clans in the pre-Romanovian epoch. These “illustrious clans” must have occupied relatively low positions in the epoch of the Great = “Mongolian” Empire, hence their absence from the Royal Genealogical Book.

Let us make the following comment in re the destruction of the rank books in 1682. According to our reconstruction, the royal dynasty of the Russian Empire (aka The Horde) was wiped out after the Great Strife of the XVII century and the fragmentation of the Empire, likewise the most distinguished aristocratic clans. The persons that had topped the hierarchy of the *mestnichestvo* must have violently opposed the mutiny of the Reformation and done their best

to preserve the Empire. However, they turned out the losing party. The Empire was split up into a multitude of independent states in the late XVI – early XVII century; the new rulers of these countries had often occupied low positions in the former imperial hierarchy.

This is quite obvious from the genealogies of the Russian “aristocracy” of the Romanovian epoch. All of these “distinguished” clans, including the Romanovs themselves, have been of foreign origin ([193]). Their ancestors came to Russian service in the XIV-XVI century, and had originated from the territories that later became Germany, England, Sweden etc. The implication is that the power went to the representatives of the third and the fourth level of the *mestnichestvo* hierarchy after the coup of the XVII century – provincial aristocracy from the lands conquered during the Great = “Mongolian” and the Ottoman = Ataman conquest. The predecessors of the Romanovian aristocracy had all been foreigners, which might be why “a Russian genealogy had almost been ... humiliating for a state official in the XVII century [in the Romanovian epoch, that is – Auth.]” ([27], page 28).

All of the above means that the ancestors of the Romanovs and their new aristocracy had belonged to the third and the fourth levels of the old hierarchy at best. Their rather humble origins were therefore recorded in the old books of ranks. It is little wonder that the Romanovs had done their best to destroy these books after having seized the Russian throne.