into the mountains, putting them to complete rout” ([183], Volume 3, page 125). After this “rout”, Pougachev takes Kazan. Further also: “Mikhelson was approaching Kazan. Pougachev sent his troops towards him, but was forced to retreat towards Kazan. Another battle was fought here; Pougachev’s army was crushed completely” ([183], Volume 3, page 125). What does the “defeated” Pougachev do? “Pougachev crossed the Volga and turned towards Nizhniy Novgorod, with the objective of reaching Moscow eventually. The fact that the mutineers were moving in this direction horrified Moscow as well as Nizhniy Novgorod. The Empress had decided to lead the army herself in order to save Moscow and Russia; however, she was talked out of it… The Turkish campaign had been over by that time; Souvorov had returned, and was put in charge of the army sent against the mutineers” ([183], Volume 3, page 125).

E. P. Savelyev, the well-known author of a historiographical work about the Don army, tells us about “14 Don regiments of the regular army sent against Pougachev’s rebels” ([757], page 428).

Even the heavily edited Romanovian version of history makes it obvious that the “suppression of the mutiny” required the participation of the regular army, led by A. V. Souvorov in person – the military commander-in-chief of the Romanovian army (see [183], Volume 3, page 125). This is easy to understand – we have before us the records of a civil war, and not a mere punitive campaign against rebellious...
Fig. 12.30. German map of Russia and the Great Tartary. The French legend at the top of the map is as follows: Carte de l’Empire de Russie & de la Grande Tartarie dressée avec soin par F. L. Gussefeld & publiée par les Herit de Homann, l’an 1786. Left part of the map.

Fig. 12.31. German map of Russia and the Great Tartary. Right part of the map.
peasants. There were large professional armies involved from either side, complete with heavy cavalry and artillery.

By the way, the Ural factories were on the side of Pougachev, and are known to have cast cannons for him. According to the Romanovian version, the Ural workers “rebelled” and joined Pougachev ([183], Volume 3, page 125). However, the real situation must have been different – the Ural factories had simply belonged to the Muscovite Tartary back in the day, whose army was led by Pougachev. Little wonder that the Siberian manufacturers of weapons had served his ends.

The Romanovian version of history suggests that Pougachev had illegitimately proclaimed himself Czar Pyotr Fyodorovich, or Peter III Romanov ([183], Volume 3, page 126; see also [709], page 687). Whenever Pougachev entered a city, he would be met by the clergy and the merchant guild as well as the simple townsfolk. For instance, “on 27 July Pougachev entered Saransk… He was received by the townsfolk, the clergy and the merchants alike… Pougachev had approached Penza … the townsfolk had received him, bending their knees, carrying icons and loaves of bread as tokens of welcome and respect” ([709], page 690). Further also: “In Saransk, Pougachev was received by Archimandrite Alexander, who had carried a cross and the Gospel; the latter mentioned Czarina Oustinia Petrovna in his prayers during church serv-

Pougachev is brought to the following conclusion: “The regular townsfolk supported Pougachev, likewise the clergy, all the way up to the archimandrites and the archbishops” ([709], page 697).

It is most likely that the real name of the Czar, or Khan of Tobolsk, remains unknown to us today; the name Pougachev must be an invention of the Romanovian historians. Alternatively, they may have chosen a simple Cossack with this eloquent a name – it is plainly visible that “Pougachev” translates as “pougach” or “pougalo” – “scare”, “scarecrow” etc. This is how the Romanovs chose a “fitting name” for Czar Dmitriy Ivanovich – also an “impostor”, according to their version. He received the “surname” Otrepiev – translating as “otrebye”, or “scum”. This was obviously done in order to compromise the people that had claimed the throne as their own in every which way possible, making them look and sound like “obvious impostors”. The above is easy enough to see as a psychological method of an experienced propaganda team.

As a matter of fact, A. S. Pushkin reports that the Yaik Cossacks who had fought for Pougachev used to claim that “a certain Pougachev had indeed been a member of their party; however, he had nothing in common with Czar Peter III [the name Peter III was obviously introduced by A. S. Pushkin himself – Auth.], their liege and leader” ([709], page 694). In other words, the Yaik Cossacks did not consider Pougachev, who had been executed by the Romanovs, their leader, referring to a certain Czar instead. We are unlikely to ever identify the latter using the Romanovian version of the events. The Romanovs were obviously striving to make the whole world believe that there can be no lawful Czars in Russia but themselves.

By the way, A. S. Pushkin reports that Pougachev answered Panin’s question: “How dare you call yourself Czar?” evasively, claiming that somebody else had been Czar ([709], page 694). The scenario is perfectly easy to understand – the Romanovs were trying to present their war with the Muscovite Tartary as a simple suppression of a “peasant uprising”; a simple Cossack was executed in Moscow for this purpose, someone who had been supposed to represent the impos-
tor, so as to make it obvious to everyone that the Cossack in question doesn’t remotely resemble a Czar.

In fig. 12.33 we reproduce a rare old “portrait of Pougachev written over that of Catherine II” (Anonymous XVIII century artist, State Museum of History; see [331], Volume 1, page 351).

2.5. Rapid expansion of the territory governed by the Romanovs after their victory over “Pougachev”

According to a number of the XVIII century maps, the border of Muscovite Tartary had been very close to Moscow. This must have troubled the Romanovs a great deal, and so Peter the Great made the only right decision in this situation – to transfer the capital further away, to the marshy banks of the Gulf of Finland. This is where the new capital, St. Petersburg, had been built at the order of Peter the Great. The Romanovs found this place convenient for a variety of reasons. Firstly, the new capital was at a distance from the Horde, or Muscovite Tartary, and would be harder for the latter to reach. Furthermore, should the Horde attack, it would be easier to escape to the West from St. Petersburg than from Moscow – one could virtually board a ship from the porch of one’s palace. The Romanovs obviously didn’t fear an invasion from the West, the historical homeland of the pro-Western House of the Romanovs.

The official Romanovian explanation of the motivation behind the transfer of the Russian capital to St. Petersburg is anything but convincing – Peter the Great had presumably required “an outlet to Europe” to facilitate trade. However, one could easily trade from the banks of the Gulf of Finland without transferring the capital here; a large seaport would suffice for that purpose. Why make it capital? The “outlet” thesis is becoming more understandable to us now – as we have mentioned, the Romanovs had usurped the Russian throne, and they required this “outlet” to maintain their Western contacts and family ties; they also needed to have an escape option in case of hostile military action from the part of their enfeebled yet mortally dangerous neighbour – the Horde, or Muscovite Tartary, which had been the largest country in the world up until the XVIII century, as the 1771 edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica is happy to report ([1118], Volume 2, pages 682-684).

This might give us a better understanding of just why the Romanovs would want to flee the warm continental Moscow and to transfer the capital to the cold St. Petersburg in the swampy coastal marshlands, which was also periodically afflicted by disastrous floods.

In fig. 12.34 one sees the title page of the Britannica’s second volume, which contains the above-mentioned important data about the European concept of geography in 1771. We must point out that many geographical inconsistencies of the old maps are seen instantly; however, their true reason only becomes clear once we manage to formulate the question of whether the maps of the alleged XV-XVI century could be misdated by modern scientists.

Another interesting fact is as follows: Siberia only became a popular deportation destination after the victory of the Romanovs over Pougachev – the very end of the XVIII century, that is. The exiles were sent
to the so-called Solovki (a popular name of the Solovetskiye Islands), and to the North in general – not the East. Siberian exiles become a tradition somewhat later; in particular, Tobolsk became a popular exile destination in 1790, when A. N. Radishchev had been sent there ([797], page 1092; also [185], page 467). After that, Tobolsk became the Russian Australia – nearly every felon would be sent there (the Decembrists, for instance; see [185], page 467). However, there had been no Tobolsk exiles recorded in history before 1790; the enormous state system of Siberian exiles and penitentiaries was created in the XIX century.

Everything becomes clear – the Romanovs could not exile anyone to Siberia before the end of the XVIII century, because they had not owned the land – Siberia had been part of the Muscovite Tartary, the last remnant of the Horde and a Russian state that had been hostile towards the Romanovs. The latter had to defeat “Pougachev” in order to obtain access to Siberia and the Pacific coast in the Far East.

As we mentioned above, the Romanovs only began the process of distributing the names of the former Russian provinces (whole countries, in fact, once parts of the Great = “Mongolian” Empire, qv in CHRON4, Chapter 13:20) across the new maps of Russia. Furthermore, the Romanovs started to change the coats of arms of the Russian cities and provinces after the defeat of “Pougachev” and not any earlier.

A. S. Pushkin concludes his biography of Pougachev with the following observations about the outcome of the war against Pougachev: “The provinces that were too large became divided, and the communications between all parts of the empire were largely improved” ([709], page 697). We are therefore told that after having suppressed “the revolt of Pougachev”, the Romanovs “suddenly discovered” some of the Russian provinces to be too big, and started to divide them into smaller parts. Everything appears to be perfectly clear – the Romanovs were dividing the regions of the recently conquered Muscovite Tartary. They must have added them to the bordering provinces, which had grown abnormally as a result. These gigantic provinces were later divided into smaller ones without much haste.

Moreover, it turns out that “communications have improved” after the victory over Pougachev. Why would that be? Could the Romanovs have got the opportunity of making some of the old routes straighter after the conquest of Muscovite Tartary – the ones they made curved and convoluted initially, so as to keep away from the hostile Siberian and American Horde? Regular routes to Siberia all postdate the “re-volt of Pougachev”.

In 2000 we received a letter from Vladimir Georgiyevich Vishnev, a resident of Sverdlovsk. He points out the following in particular as he writes about our analysis: “The opinion of the authors about Asia being beyond Catherine’s control before the war with Pougachev can be confirmed by the fact that there had been an active customs office in the Ural city of Verkhotourye back in the day. The city had been the centre of the Ural region; the size of its cathedral equals that of the famous Isaakiyevskiy Cathedral in St. Petersburg. The city of Verkhotourye is being revived currently. The customs office of Verkhotourye was famous enough to have become immortalised in the name of a brand of wine popular in the region”.

The scale of the Romanovian “reforms” that came in the wake of the victory over “Pougachev” is char-